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ABSTRACT 
As artefacts, gameworlds are designed and developed to fulfil certain functional and 
creative objectives. Players infer these purposes and aspirations from various aspects 
of their engagement with games. Based on their socio-cultural background, their 
sensitivities, gameplay preferences, and game literacy, they construct a subjective 
interpretation of the intentions of the creators of the game. In analogy to Wayne C. 
Booth’s notion of the implied author, we will call the figure to which players ascribe 
those intentions ‘the implied designer’. In this paper, we introduce the notion of the 
implied (game) designer and present an initial account of the way players ascribe 
meaning to gameworlds and act within them based on what they perceive to be the 
intentions of the implied designer of the game. 
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1 - MEANING AND INTENT IN FICTION 
Works of fiction are artefacts: they are conceived and created to be interpreted and 
understood in specific ways. The fact that works of fiction such as novels have authors 
is not a trivial observation when trying to understand how appreciators interpret the 
meaning of the works in question. In the field of artefact studies, the purpose of artefacts 
is largely understood as being determined by their intended function (see Millikan 
1999; McLaughlin 2001; Thomasson 2007; Evnine 2016). As artefacts, works of fiction 
are also interpreted on the basis of what is their perceived, intended function. Being 
conscious of the artefactual nature of fictional works, appreciators tend to infer the 
meaning of these works from what they believe the creators of these works intended to 
communicate (Currie 1990, 30-31). Their assumptions about the creator’s intentions 
are central not only in determining their interpretations of a certain work, but also of 
the world presented within it, and their expectations toward it: 
 
We may think of a narrative as a door-way into the world of its story. But 
we are never far from conscious awareness of the narrative’s artefactual 
status, where facts about the motives of its maker, and the constraints on 
the maker’s situation, inform our expectations of the story’s events (Currie 
2010, xvii-xviii). 
 
Kathleen Stock goes so far as to claim that the “fictional content of a text is determined 
by certain of the intentions with which the text is written” (Stock 2017, 16). Every little 
detail in fiction might gain significance because appreciators believe it to be described 
for a reason. Vice versa, everything that is not perceived as intentional by its creator 
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(typos, mistakes, contradictions, editorial flaws, etc.) is likely to be ignored by readers 
precisely because of it being perceived as unintentional (Walton 1990, 183; Currie 
1990, 87; Matravers 2014, 131). 
 
This does not mean, however, that one must be aware of the intentions of the creator of 
a work of fiction to be able to understand it. After all, one is perfectly capable of making 
sense of – say – a novel or a film by simply interpreting the characteristics of the work 
itself. Besides, fiction appreciators are not always in the position to be certain about the 
intentions of the creator, and can derive meaning from the work while being ignorant 
(or even completely mistaken) about the author’s intentions. Lastly, stating that the 
intentions of the actual author are crucial when interpreting the meaning of a work 
would be an instance of the ‘intentional fallacy’ (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946), as it 
ignores the ways in which readers independently ‘make meaning’ during their reading, 
and how free they are in the interpretation of the work. 
 
How to reconcile the claim that readers cannot, and do not have to, know the intentions 
of the actual author, with the fact that they are clearly guided by what they perceive to 
be the author’s intentions when interpreting of a work of fiction? Within narratology, 
the concept of the implied author has been used to reconcile those two divergent 
perspectives. Wayne C. Booth introduced the implied author as follows:  
 
As he writes, [the actual author] creates not simply an ideal, impersonal 
“man in general” but an implied version of “himself” that is different from 
the implied authors we meet in other men’s works. […] Whether we call 
this implied author an “official scribe”, or adopt the term recently revived 
by Kathleen Tillotson—the author’s “second self”—it is clear that the 
picture the reader gets of this presence is one of the author’s most 
important effects. However impersonal he may try to be, his reader will 
inevitably construct a picture of the official scribe (Booth 1961, 70-71).  
 
We want to emphasize, here, that the implied author is not determined by the actual 
author and his intentions. Rather, it is an idea that is dynamically constructed by readers 
during their engagement with the author’s work: 
 
The concept of implied author refers to the author-image evoked by a work 
and constituted by the stylistic, ideological, and aesthetic properties for 
which indexical signs can be found in the text. Thus, the implied author 
has an objective and a subjective side: it is grounded in the indexes of the 
text, but these indexes are perceived and evaluated differently by each 
individual reader. We have the implied author in mind when we say that 
each and every cultural product contains an image of its maker (Schmid 
2009, 161). 
 
Readers construct an implied author on the basis of their interpretation of a text. At the 
same time, they infer the meaning of the text from the intentions that they believe this 
implied author to have [1]. In this sense, we can understand Seymour Chatman’s 
preference for the term ‘inferred author’ when referring to that figure (Chatman 1990, 
77). On these premises, we argue that the meaning of a text depends on the intentions 
that the reader believes to lie at the basis of the work’s creation. 
 
To be sure, we do not intend to claim that the effective intentions of the actual author 
are necessarily relevant in that process. In fact, the notion of the implied author is 
generally used to support the idea that the meaning of a work is the result of authorial 
intent, but that knowledge about the actual author’s intentions is not necessary to 
interpret the piece in question (Ryan 2011, 30). The relevance of the concept of the 
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implied author as the perceived creator of a work becomes apparent when we consider 
the way readers’ assumptions about this creator influence their interpretation of a 
certain work (Schmid 2009, 168). As Nelles writes: “the implied author’s implicit 
intentions, not those expressed by the historical author or narrator, are the definitive 
source of meaning in a work” (Nelles 1993, 22). Although readers do not have to – and 
often cannot – know the intentions of the actual author, they inevitably interpret and 
construct the meaning of a work on the basis of the fact that it was intentionally written 
by someone. They ascribe special meaning to objects, spaces, and events described in 
novels based on their perception of these elements as deliberate creations.  
 
Note that, although we have been talking about a singular implied author connected to 
any kind of work, collaborative works of fiction such as movies or digital games are 
better understood as the product of distributed authorship (see Gualeni et al. 2019). Yet, 
we follow Currie in arguing that it is unproblematic to posit one implied creator even 
in such cases [2]. Like Currie, we understand the notion of the implied author as not 
referring to an actual person, but rather to be the sum of the creative intentions that the 
reader perceives to lie at the basis of a work. 
 
 
2 - GAMEWORLDS AND THE IMPLIED DESIGNER 
In this section of our paper, we will apply the notion of the implied author to digital 
games. In analogy with how the implied author was discussed above, we define the 
‘implied designer’ as follows: 
 
The implied (game) designer is the conceptualization of a designer that 
the player constructs on the basis of their dynamic interpretation of the 
game (understood widely, together with its paraludic elements, including 
marketing material). To this inferred figure, the player ascribes all those 
intentions that they think lie at the basis of the creation of the game in 
question. 
 
Over and above the already-discussed benefits of invoking the implied author to 
describe and explain appreciators’ interpretative efforts, the notion of the implied 
(game) designer can also be useful in explaining their behaviors. In digital games, the 
implied designer not only guides the interpretation of the presented gameworlds [3], 
but also the ways in which players position themselves (and orient their goals) within 
those worlds. This means that the intentions that the player infers to be the creative 
force behind a gameworld contribute to determining the way they interactively traverse 
that world and give meaning to their own existence within it. 
 
Within digital game studies, the implied author and designer intentions have been 
discussed before. Aarseth’s (2011) and Leino’s (2012) respective understandings of the 
implied or ideal game as an idea that is constructed and refined by players of a digital 
game have a degree of similarity with our understanding of the implied (game) 
designer. Aarseth describes the implied game objects as follows: 
 
An implied game object does not exist, but is imagined by the player as 
what the game is, or ought to be. A game riddled with software bugs, for 
example, is perceived as merely the flawed, actual version of an 
uncompleted, implied game. We conceptualize the real game as being 
without the annoying bugs, and the present version as a premature, 
unwanted stand-in version for the real (implied) thing. (Aarseth 2011, 66) 
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At first sight, this notion of the implied game object seems to be closely related to the 
notion of the implied (game) designer that we propose in this paper, as Aarseth defines 
the game object as based on an inference of what is was intended to be like. He 
introduces the notion of the implied game object in his endeavor to form a useful game 
ontology. With that purpose in mind, Aarseth does not (nor does he want to) account 
for the way players behave in the gameworld or for the ways in which players actually 
interpret the game as they play. Instead, he emphasizes the differences between the 
implied game object and the actual game object, or “the object the player actually 
encounters” (Aarseth 2011, 66).  
 
Similarly separating the ‘ideal game’ from the game as actually encountered in play, 
Leino argues that the ideal game is an irrelevant notion for the field of game studies. 
“Unless I am doing game design research,” he writes, “my object of study is not the 
‘ideal game’: i.e. the assumed designer’s assumed intentions fallibly manifested in the 
playable artifact, but the playable artifact as it exists in the world” (Leino 2012). Unlike 
both Aarseth and Leino, we argue that the ideal or implied game is not separable from 
players’ actual experiences of games. Their notion of the implied or ideal game (the 
game that players dynamically piece together based on the intentions they assume the 
designer of the game to have) is, instead, a prerequisite both for the actual playing of 
the game and for understanding the game as it is played. 
 
The idea that designers’ intentions influence or even determine a player experience 
with a game is, often implicitly, present in academic works in the field of game studies. 
Game scholars have discussed the role of designers’ intentions in gameplay with regard 
to, for example, the idea that there is a prescribed or right way of playing games 
(Deriglazov 2018; Nguyen 2019), or that there is an implied role for the player to take 
on (Tanenbaum 2013; Aarseth 2014), or that virtual worlds present a blueprint for the 
player’s existence within this world (Leino 2012), or even that playing games brings 
with it the inherent possibility of going against the designer’s intentions (Aarseth 2004, 
2014; Leino 2012; Back et al. 2019). Within these works, however, the notion of the 
implied (game) designer is not specifically analyzed, and never becomes the focus of 
scholarly inquiry. 
 
This does not mean that the notion of the implied designer is without tradition within 
game studies. Thon, for example, defines the implied game designer as a particular 
ideological perspective that “manifests itself in the overall design and presentation of a 
game world as well as in the rules and goals of the game” (Thon 2009, 296-297). Thon 
uses the notion of the implied game designer with explicit regard to the (im)morality 
of game content, referring to it as a “reconstruction of the system of norms and values 
inherent in computer games” (ibid., 297). In this endeavor, he commits to Booth’s 
understanding of the implied author as a theoretical construct that was originally meant 
to protect actual authors from moral condemnation. More specifically, the implied 
author was taken as the source of the ideological perspective of a text, making it 
possible to criticize that text for being immoral or unreliable without blaming its actual 
author and vice versa (cf. Bal 1981, 42). Neither the immorality of game content (Thon 
2009) nor the unreliability of game narration (cf. Roe & Mitchell 2019) are, however, 
the focus in this paper. Instead, we will frame the implied (game) designer as an 
explanatory concept that clarifies the ways in which a player interprets a gameworld 
and acts within it. 
 
Klevjer (2002) also briefly refers to the concept of the implied designer. Relying on 
Booth’s interpretation of the implied author, he writes:  
 
In a computer game, there is also an implied author speaking, creating the 
diegetic world through general descriptions, through simulations, and 
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through the pre-written events. The ‘implied designer’ may occasionally 
reveal signs of individuality, but as a general rule, he takes the form of a 
familiar, generic voice. (Klevjer 2002, 196) 
 
Klevjer mentions the implied designer with specific regard to game narrative. He notes 
how the implied designer of a game authors a narrative framework in which players 
can act, but does not elaborate on the differences between an implied author and an 
implied designer, or on how players construct the implied designer. 
 
In conclusion, to this date game scholars have referred to the concept of the implied 
designer implicitly or passingly, either without offering a precise definition of the 
concept, or without clarifying how it is constructed by each player and how this 
inferential process influences the experience of digital gameworlds (see also Kücklich 
2001; Kirkland 2009; Wolf 2012, 191; Leino 2016; Äyrämö 2017). In the following 
sections of this paper, we will show how the notion of the implied (game) designer is 
useful in describing and explaining how the assumed designer’s intentions are a central 
factor in guiding players’ interpretations of gameworlds and their active roles within 
these worlds. 
 
 
2.1 - A Hermeneutically Inspired Approach 
In this paper, we take a hermeneutically inspired view of implied authorship, meaning 
that the implied designer of a digital game is defined as being constructed in a dynamic 
relationship between the experience of a gameworld and the socio-cultural background, 
preferences, sensitivities, and game literacy of the player doing the constructing (see 
section 2.2). We thus diverge from Currie’s interpretation of the implied author as “an 
agent with intentions corresponding to the implicatures it is reasonable for readers to 
attribute to the author given relevant background knowledge” (Currie in Maes 2017, 
214). Currie understands the implied author as the ground from which the meaning of 
a text emerges, a ground that can be derived from the text by every hypothetical reader 
who possesses the relevant background knowledge (i.e. about the genre of the text, its 
subject, situatedness in history, etc.) (Currie 1990, 100). Unlike Currie, we believe the 
implied creator of a work not to be fully determined by this work itself, but to depend 
on the individual who appreciates and interprets this work. 
 
Therefore, our approach to the implied designer does not only consider the qualities of 
a game on which the individual construction of an implied designer is based, but also 
the background knowledge, the sensitivities, the gameplay preferences, and the socio-
cultural context of the player doing the constructing. As such, our approach to the 
implied (game) designer is inspired by a larger, real-time hermeneutic approach to 
digital games (see Aarseth 2001; Arjoranta 2011, 2015). As Arjoranta writes:  
 
Games do not present or convey certain meanings or values simply 
because they are games, although the structures of the media affect the 
ways those meanings or values can be transmitted. Games embody the 
values and choices of the people that made them, the culture that surrounds 
them and the prejudgments of the people playing them. (Arjoranta 2015, 
84) 
 
Although the designers of course influence what a game can mean, they are not the sole 
authority on this matter (Arjoranta 2015, 85). Taking the player-constructed implied 
(game) designer as being responsible for a game’s meaning is compatible with the 
hermeneutical idea that the meaning of artworks flows forth out of the interplay 
between the artwork, its interpreter, and their context (Gadamer 2004, 115, 157). After 
all, the implied designer is constructed by a player based on their dynamic interpretation 
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of the gameworld, an interpretation that is rooted in the player’s own social context, 
cultural background, game literacy, and individual sensitivities and preferences.  
 
It is important to note that, contrary to a fully hermeneutical approach, we do not want 
to make any normative claims about there being ‘correct’ (or intersubjectively agreed 
on) ways to interpret games. Very often, reflections on how games imply the intentions 
of their creators have generated arguments about the ‘right ways’ to interpret and play 
games. C. Thi Nguyen, for example, writes that games have ‘prescriptive ontologies’: 
they are works that are “partially constituted by prescriptions about how they are to be 
encountered” (Nguyen 2019). He argues that a game is fixed by its creator, who 
presents their work to the public in a way that makes it clear under which conditions 
the work in question can be encountered, for example by offering them a game manual 
(2019). According to Nguyen, people can still play in whatever way they want, but 
whenever they do not follow the creator’s prescriptions, they are simply not playing 
the ‘actual game’. Frameworks like these can be useful in determining what could be 
considered the ‘official’ version – or the canonical interpretation – of a game. They are, 
however, ineffective in relation to investigating the actual player’s experience of a 
certain gameworld and their behavior within it. Similar to how readers can produce a 
variety of interpretations of the same text, players can infer diverging intentions of the 
designer while playing a game. 
 
Therefore, our goals in this paper are descriptive rather than normative, and our 
description and analysis of the implied game designer is based on the experiences and 
interpretations of individual players. An important advantage of this hermeneutically 
inspired – but merely descriptive – approach to the implied designer is that it can 
account for cases of divergent player behavior. It does so by showing how the inferred 
intentions of the implied game designer can, and often do, vary among players with 
different backgrounds, and even differ from the intentions game designers wanted 
players to infer. A digital game might make it hard for the player to infer what the 
designer intended when adding certain objects or areas to the gameworld. This can be 
a consequence of the game failing to make its intended uses clear to players who are 
missing the relevant knowledge or the needed game literacy. It might also be the result 
of a gameworld being deliberately vague or even misleading concerning the objectives 
for which it was created, thus creating a sense of mystery or even elicit a sense of the 
sublime (see Vella 2015). Due to such difficulties in inferring the intention behind 
certain objects or events within gameworlds, there are several digital games that are 
hardly ever understood or fully explored by single players, thus resulting in a great 
variety of ways in which the game is interpreted and played. 
 
Aside from its explanatory power when it comes to player behavior, and maybe exactly 
because of this power, our focus on players’ individual interpretation and construction 
of the implied (game) designer can also be useful within game design. Reflecting on 
how players derive meaning from their game and its paraludic material, game designers 
can take the idea of the implied designer into account when designing towards a certain 
player experience. This knowledge is especially useful in the design of the so-called 
‘tutorial’ sections and in the initial phases of a player’s engagement with a game, where 
it is particularly important that the implied (game) designer is reliable and easily 
inferred, so as to give new players unambiguous information and a clear direction (see 
Gualeni & Vella 2020, 58-59). Additionally, being able to understand and anticipate 
how players infer implied designers’ intentions, designers can creatively use this 
knowledge to make their games surprising, annoying, and even potentially more 
engaging. The projection of false intentions within the game (for example leading to 
red herrings), the comically overt expression of designer intentions (which 
metafictionally reveal the game’s artefactual status), and the vague hinting at 
mysterious meanings (inviting the player to further explore the gameworld) are only 
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some examples of how designers can subvert and toy with the player’s construction of 
implied designer. 
 
 
2.2 - Constructing the Implied Designer 
Having clarified the hermeneutical influence to our approach, we can now discuss in 
detail what role player interpretations have in the construction of the implied (game) 
designer. We invite the reader to recall, for this purpose, that the idea of the implied 
author within narratology is dependent both on the qualities of the authored artefact 
and on the personal interpretation of the reader (see section 1): 
 
On the one hand, it has an objective component: the implied author is seen 
as a hypostasis of the work’s structure. On the other hand, it has a 
subjective component relating to reception: the implied author is seen as 
a product of the reader’s meaning-making activity. […] At any rate, it 
must be remembered that, like the readings of different recipients, the 
various interpretations of a single reader are each associated with a 
different implied author. Each single reading reconstructs its author. 
(Schmid 2009, 162) 
 
In analogy with Schmid, we argue that in each play session, a specific implied (game) 
designer is constructed by the player. This inference is based on their interpretive 
experience of the gameworld in its various elements and qualities. These elements and 
qualities are taken as primary indications of the intentions that the player attributes to 
the game designer. Some of these intentions can be explicitly presented in the game: 
think of non-player characters explaining to the player how to use the controller, or 
pop-up text boxes informing the player about what to do and where to go. Others can 
be more subtly embedded into the gameworld: a path of blood spatters on a floor can 
give hints to the player as what might have happened in a room and a clue as to where 
to go next. Similarly, enemies that are too hard might suggest to players that they should 
level up in other areas first, and the way the game rewards players (in the form of 
currency or experience points) is an unequivocal indication that whatever they did was 
desirable and might be worthy of repetition. All these ludic elements can be interpreted 
as clues of how to understand the gameworld and behave within it precisely because 
players perceive them as purposefully designed: the intentions of the designer are 
implied in these aspects of gameplay, and guide players through the designed 
environment. 
 
The way elements and qualities of gameworlds are pieced together to infer the 
intentions of the designer is, however, dependent on how each individual player 
encounters and interprets them. The player’s own socio-cultural context, preferences, 
sensitivities, and background knowledge (especially about game conventions), play a 
crucial role in this interpretation process. As many of these factors are highly subjective 
and vary greatly from player to player, we will focus on how player’s ludic knowledge 
influences the way they construct the implied (game) designer. In this pursuit, we will 
make use of Peter Howell’s distinction between ‘transludic’ and ‘interludic’ knowledge 
(see Howell 2016). 
 
According to Howell, a player’s transludic knowledge is knowledge relating “to 
multiple other games that an individual may have played in the past” (Howell 2016, 1). 
A player’s transludic knowledge is a component of their overall game literacy and, 
consequently, is part of what influences how they will infer an implied (game) designer. 
The importance of game literacy in the construction of the implied designer is 
especially conspicuous in situations in which players are not familiar enough with game 
conventions to usefully infer designer intentions from their play experience. This is, for 
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example, the case in some of the videos on the REACT Youtube channel, which shows 
elderly citizens playing games such as the intro to The Last of Us (Naughty Dog 2013). 
When the cutscenes stop and the camera switches to a third-person view from behind 
the back of the playable character, these players do not realize that they should start 
moving. One of the elderly men even criticizes the fact that the character is not doing 
anything, despite just having been asked to look for her dad (REACT 2015b, 3:05). 
Due to their lack of the necessary game literacy, the elderly people in the video simply 
could not infer that both the camera change and the explicit request to look for the 
character’s dad are actually indications of what the (implied) designer wants the player 
to do. Instead, they have to be explicitly told to start using the controller by the film-
shooting crew (REACT 2015b, 3:11). Something similar happens when these same 
people are made to play Grand Theft Auto V (Rockstar North 2013). Many of them start 
driving a car in-game, very carefully trying not to bump into anyone and stopping in 
front of every red light. When asked why she brakes so brusquely, one of the women 
exclaims that there was a stop sign (REACT 2015a, 2:51). She saw a stop sign in the 
game and inferred from this that she was supposed to stop. Due to their very limited 
literacy in digital games and relative conventions, these elderly players construct an 
implied (game) designer that significantly diverges from the implied (game) designer 
that a more game-literate player would piece together. 
 
Another element that might be important when constructing the implied (game) 
designer and, by extension, inferring the meaning of gameworlds, is the player’s 
interludic knowledge. Howell describes interludic knowledge as a specific type of 
transludic knowledge, which is “contextualised within a specific game series or 
franchise, or applicable to a small subset of games rather than many different games” 
(Howell 2016, 2). Interludic knowledge can be knowledge about other gameworlds 
created by the same designer, or knowledge relating to a specific genre of digital games 
(such as walking simulators, sandbox games, first person shooters, etc.). In the earliest 
discussion of the implied author, Booth already considered the fact that the implied 
authors of different works by the same author would be similar. Elaborating on Booth’s 
position, Schmid writes: 
 
The implied authors of various works by a single concrete author display 
certain common features and thereby constitute what we might call an 
œuvre author, a stereotype that Booth (1979, 270) refers to as a ‘career 
author.’ There are also more general author stereotypes that re-late not to 
an œuvre but to literary schools, stylistic currents, periods, and genres. 
(Schmid 2009, 167) 
 
Applying this idea to digital games, we can say that the way players give meaning to a 
game might be influenced by their constructing an implied ‘oeuvre designer’. Players 
who are already familiar with the Dark Souls (2011) games and their conventions might 
recognize many game elements in the game Sekiro (2019), since these games were 
created by the same company, FromSoftware. As such, they might make assumptions 
about the digital gameworld of Sekiro that are based on what they know about the Dark 
Souls series (2011-2016). Moreover, as Schmid already suggests, players can also base 
their inferences on their knowledge of genre conventions that are specific to digital 
games. Games that are advertised as horror games, for example, will be approached on 
the premise that the implied designer of the game has the goal to scare players. A game 
which famously toys with the way players infer meaning based on genre conventions 
is Gone Home (Gaynor 2013). This game seems to position itself within the horror 
genre, as it is set in a deserted family house during a nightly storm on the door of which 
a note is placed which begs the player-character not to go digging around to find out 
what happened. Gone Home does not ultimately present its players with a horror story, 
but rather with a coming-of-age queer love story, thus subverting player expectations. 
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A type of knowledge about digital games that Howell does not mention or consider in 
his paper is metaludic knowledge. This is knowledge about a game that can be gleaned 
outside of its gameworld: information derived from paraludic material such as game 
trailers, the game’s box-art and manual, walkthroughs, and even from sources that are 
not directly related to one's experience of the game, such as FAQ websites, let’s play 
videos, reviews, interviews with the actual designers, and so on. Although not 
necessary for the inference of the implied designer, metaludic knowledge can have a 
profound influence on it. Players who had already read other people’s reactions to Gone 
Home, for example, constructed the implied (game) designer as not intending to scare 
them, but merely intending to make them think they would be scared by the game, thus 
influencing the way they approached and interpreted the game.  
 
In conclusion, the implied (game) designer is a construct that emerges from the 
interpretative and interactive interplay between the characteristics of a game and the 
contextual qualities of the players of that game, which notably include their level of 
skill, their game literacy, their ethnicity and cultural background, and their familiarity 
with that specific genre and franchise. On the one hand, then, it is reasonable to believe 
that well-informed players will infer very similar implied designers from the same 
game. On the other, it is safe to assume that the implied designer constructed by 
different players of the same game will differ (albeit slightly), and so will the implied 
designer that is constructed by the same player over the course of subsequent 
playthroughs. 
 
 
2.3 - The Implied Designer and the Experience of Digital Gameworlds 
Up until this point, we have discussed how players construct an implied designer. In 
this part, we will discuss how this construction influences our experiences of (and 
within) the worlds of digital games. After all, the player’s awareness of the artefactual 
nature of digital games determines their interpretation of gameworlds and their 
behaviors within them. The construction of the implied designer is a precondition to 
the very appreciation of digital gameworlds: the way in which players play a game is 
based on their recognition that the gameworld is designed with specific goals, 
affordances, and prescriptions for certain kinds of imaginings. Players’ interpretation 
of the events that take place in a gameworld and of their own position within it 
necessarily depend on their construction of the implied (game) designer’s intentions.  
  
To begin with, whenever players enter a gameworld, their virtual existence is already 
meaningful insofar as they perceive it as being offered to them for a reason. The 
gameworld presents a framework that is formed by the affordances disclosed to players, 
by the goals that they can accomplish, by existential threats within the gameworld, and 
by whatever else players can perceive as intentionally crafted by the implied designer. 
In line with this perspective, the gameworld itself and every object or event within it is 
recognized as having a special meaning because the player understands these objects 
and characteristics to be placed there intentionally by the implied designer. In this 
aspect, digital games are similar to any other work of fiction. Just like when reading a 
novel, it is always reasonable to ask of any object or event within the world presented 
in a work why the designer intended them to be there, and to give meaning to the object 
or event based on these reasons. However, the difference between novels and digital 
games in this regard is that players’ awareness of the artefactual nature of objects and 
happenings in digital games not only determines the way these objects and happenings 
are interpreted by players, but also how the player will behave towards them and 
integrate them within their own Being-in-the-gameworld (see Gualeni & Vella 2020).  
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Players’ consciousness of the fact that gameworlds are intentionally designed also tends 
to mean that their behavior is easily guided by seemingly banal characteristics of 
gameworlds. Things that would be absurd to take as being especially meaningful or as 
a justified object of further attention in one’s actual life, are often taken as important 
guidelines within digital gameworlds. The specific growth of plants, the way sunlight 
is reflected on certain parts of the environment, or the direction of the wind, can all 
become meaningful clues to players who need to make decisions on what to do, and 
who perceive these elements as deliberate constructs placed within the gameworld by 
the designer. Examples of these kinds of ludic inferences abound. In The Legend of 
Zelda: The Wind Waker (Nintendo EAD 2002), for example, the player must make their 
way through a maze consisting of countless rooms, each of which features four doors 
leading to other rooms and is inhabited by a single, sword-wielding enemy (i.e. 
Phantom Ganon). To make it through this maze, the player must defeat Phantom Ganon 
each time they enter a new room and subsequently enter the door to which the hilt of 
Phantom Ganon’s sword points after the player defeats him (see Figure 1). Although 
this course of action would be arbitrary and quite nonsensical in actual life, in the game 
it makes sense to choose a door based on the direction of the fallen sword. This choice 
is supported by how the game situation is set up: not only are the rooms of the maze 
completely empty and the doors perfectly similar, thus making the sword one of the 
few elements the player can base their decision on, but upon defeating Phantom Ganon, 
the sword also visibly plummets to the ground, balances on its tip, and emphatically 
falls in a specific direction. The player who perceives this movement of the sword is 
not likely, as discussed before, to perceive it as a mere event, but will rather interpret it 
as a definite consequence of the implied designer’s intentions [4]. As such, it not only 
makes sense to ascribe more meaning to the position of the sword than would be 
reasonable in a non-designed situation, but many players will also do this quite 
instinctively.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The hilt of the sword of a defeated Phantom Ganon indicates the door the player is 
supposed to go through (the screenshot was taken from the 2013 high-definition remaster of 
the game) 
 
Another interesting example of such inference processes carried out by game-literate 
players consists in expecting a challenging section or a particularly dangerous 
encounter in the gameworld (i.e. a bossfight) upon approaching a wide arena-like area, 
or an abnormally large stash of health or weapon items within the gameworld. The 
  - 11 - 
same intuition can be stimulated by the digital game suddenly performing an ‘autosave’ 
(i.e. creating an automatic checkpoint from where the players can restart their game 
upon a ‘game over’).  
 
Note that players are equally guided by the intentions that they attribute to the implied 
designer when playing digital games that do not overtly offer quests or tasks to fulfill, 
or that do not have an explicit game narrative. Sandbox games, for example, are 
typically developed with the intention to grant players a wider range of action 
possibilities than narratively-bound games do, and to make players choose their own 
goals instead of prescribing them to embark on specific quests. Yet, that does not mean 
that players’ experiences of these games are independent from the influence of an 
implied (game) designer. Quite to the contrary, players approach sandbox games in 
explorative, experimental, and creative ways precisely because they know that this is 
what the implied designer intended for them to do. In general, players ascribe a certain 
value and meaning to the objects and characters they discover in a game based on what 
they think the intention of the designer was when designing these objects in the game, 
regardless of the game being narrative, quest-driven, open-world, single-player, or 
multiplayer. The presence of an HP bar in any of those games, for example, indicates 
that the implied designer intended player-characters to be vulnerable to environmental 
hazards, or the attacks of enemies or other players. The lack of an HP bar in a game 
like Journey (Thatgamecompany 2012), on the other hand, indicates to players that the 
game is likely designed for cooperative rather than competitive play. A vast body of 
water or a steep mountain range will likely signal to players that this is where the 
designer wanted to mark the boundary of an otherwise open gameworld, and that there 
is probably nothing interesting to explore beyond these limits. Moreover, the discovery 
of certain items or tools, such as the pickaxe in Minecraft (Mojang 2011), already 
frames or hints at possible actions for the player to undertake, such as mining.  
 
Lastly, the way players deal with hostile creatures, environmental obstacles, and 
puzzles and problems that they encounter within gameworlds are also influenced by 
their knowledge of these difficulties being intentionally created for them to be 
encountered and overcome. This means that player behavior is often based on the 
conviction that given challenges can be surpassed and that the game can be won, no 
matter how hopeless a situation might seem. Perceiving every problem as an artificial 
problem, the fact that there is a problem likely implies that there is also a solution. If a 
player encounters a locked door in a gameworld, for example, they will likely assume 
that there is a key to be found somewhere in that same world. This connects to players’ 
often-astounding tenacity when it comes to solving puzzles and in-game mysteries.  
 
Players’ awareness of the artificiality of a gameworld thus proves to be an influential 
factor when it comes to the way players relate to and behave in those worlds. It is 
because of the construction of an implied designer that players can find the experience 
of gameworlds meaningful. As designer intentions are implicitly present in the ways 
the gameworld appears and responds to the player, every element can be perceived as 
deliberately designed to be there, and thus as carrying special meaning and encouraging 
certain kinds of behavior. In the end, we can conclude that due to their awareness of 
the artefactual nature of gameworlds, players have a bias towards meaningfulness. The 
most banal elements and qualities of those worlds (as well as the player’s presence 
within it) tend to be understood as relevant, purposeful, and important. 
 
 
3 - Conclusions 
This paper introduced the concept of the implied (game) designer and its influence on 
how players experience and make sense of gameworlds. For this purpose, we further 
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developed and extended the notion of the implied author as it was articulated in 
narratology, and explored some of its theoretical advantages. The implied author is 
widely considered to be a useful notion to describe the way the artefactual nature of 
novels influences reader interpretation (without it being necessary for the reader to 
know anything about the intentions of the actual author). We, then, applied the notion 
of the implied author to the conceptualization and development of gameworlds, and 
labelled it the ‘implied designer’. We defined the implied (game) designer in a way that 
is inspired by the tradition of hermeneutics, that is to say as the conceptualization of 
the designer that players construct largely based on their interactive experience and 
interpretation of the game (understood widely, together with its paraludic elements, 
including marketing material). 
 
We argued that the concept of the implied (game) designer not only clarifies how 
gameworlds are interpreted, but also how players interactively and imaginatively 
engage with them. It is evident to us that the notion of the implied (game) designer can 
also be useful for game studies in a number of other ways that can be explored in more 
detail. Firstly, the concept can be used to reconcile the idea that fiction is that which is 
prescribed to be imagined with the fact that players are, to a degree, free to interpret 
and interact with the fictional worlds of videogames. The implied designer also helps 
us describe events that are perceived as anomalous within a gameworld, such as those 
caused by glitches, and clarify the way players deal with them based on the perceived 
(un)intentionality of these events.  
 
Moreover, we already briefly noted how game designers could benefit from reflecting 
on the way their games allow for potential inferences of an implied designer. There are 
cases in which the implied (game) designer has to be easily and reliably inferred by 
players for the game to be playable or enjoyable. In other cases, game designers might 
decide to toy with the player’s construction of the implied designer, potentially 
rendering their game more engaging and surprising by making it project false, vague, 
or confusing intentions. An example of this design strategy could be the purposeful use 
of red herrings (elements in a gameworld meant to mislead the players or to distract 
them from more significant tasks or activities). 
 
Lastly, we believe that the notion of the implied (game) designer provides a fruitful 
theoretical basis for a new, explanatory useful definition of ‘ludic unreliability’ and 
‘transgressive design’. In a future follow-up to this work, we plan to define games as 
ludically unreliable when they imply designer intentions that diverge from the way they 
actually function. Moreover, we will describe design decisions as transgressive when 
they are intentionally unreliable in this way. Transgressively designed games 
deliberately deceive and misguide the player in their construction of the implied 
designer, and this deception itself is an expressive component of the design, that has 
the goal of adding emotional (and potentially critical) value to the player’s experience 
of the game artefact. 
 
In sum, what we are offering in this initial exploration of the notion is a perspective on 
the implied (game) designer as a defining trait of our experiences of gameworlds, as 
our awareness of the artificiality of these worlds precedes and determines how we 
approach and interpret them. 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
[1] The process of inferring the (intentions of the) implied author from a text is thus 
circular: the implied author is both a result of and a ground for the interpretation of a 
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text. Schleiermacher noted that this circularity defines interpretation in general. He 
explains that parts of something can only be understood in terms of the whole of which 
they are a part, and the whole can only be understood in terms of the parts that make it 
up (1998, 24). This idea is now known as the ‘hermeneutic circle’ (cfr. Dilthey 1996; 
Gadamer 2004). With regard to the interpretation process of texts, it is particularly 
interesting to observe that Umberto Eco connects the circular process of hermeneutic 
with the notion of the implied author. He argued that “[s]ince the intention of the text 
is basically to produce a model reader able to make conjectures about it, the initiative 
of the model reader consists in figuring out a model author that is not the empirical one 
and that, in the end, coincides with the intention of the text. Thus, more than a parameter 
to use in order to validate the interpretation, the text is an object that the interpretation 
builds up in the course of the circular effort of validating itself on the basis of what it 
makes up as its result. I am not ashamed to admit that I am so defining the old and still 
valid 'hermeneutic circle'” (Eco 1992, 64). 
 
[2] In his 1990 book The Nature of Fiction, Currie clarifies that he will write about 
authors and their actions as if a work is always the product of a single author, even if 
that is not always strictly true: “[a]lthough it is not true, no great harm will be done by 
assuming that it is. For I take it that an act of joint authorship is exactly that: an act 
engaged in by more than one person rather than several distinct acts undertaken 
individually and patched together. This does not mean that every word must be the joint 
product of all the authors, merely that it should be understood between them that they 
are engaged in a common project and that each has, in engaging in it, the kind of 
intention I have called a fictive intention” (Currie 1990, 11-12). 
[3] In this text, we adopt a broad understanding of what constitutes a world. This 
understanding is not strictly phenomenological, as it does not require a world to be 
experienced from within. However, our understanding of what a world is does retain 
qualities of the phenomenological approach, such as its implying an intelligible set of 
relations, possibilities, and limitations. 
[4] Within action theory, philosophers tend to distinguish actions from mere events or 
happenings. In contrast to something that simply happens, action theory defines an 
‘action’ as something an agent does intentionally (Davidson 2002, 46). In this sense, 
most things that happen in a digital gameworld are not mere events, but rather 
(expressions of) actions: they are intentionally planned by the designer of this world, 
and precisely because of that, they can be assumed to have a certain significance. 
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